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Online submodular welfare maximization:
Greedy is optimal
Michael Kapralov∗† Ian Post‡† Jan Vondra´k§
Abstract
We prove that no online algorithm (even randomized, against an oblivious adversary) is better than
1/2-competitive for welfare maximization with coverage valuations, unless NP = RP . Since the Greedy
algorithm is known to be 1/2-competitive for monotone submodular valuations, of which coverage is a
special case, this proves that Greedy provides the optimal competitive ratio. On the other hand, we
prove that Greedy in a stochastic setting with i.i.d. items and valuations satisfying diminishing returns
is (1 − 1/e)-competitive, which is optimal even for coverage valuations, unless NP = RP . For online
budget-additive allocation, we prove that no algorithm can be 0.612-competitive with respect to a natural
LP which has been used previously for this problem.
1 Introduction
We study an online variant of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions: m items
are arriving online, and each item should be allocated upon arrival to one of n agents whose interest in
different subsets of items is expressed by valuation functions wi : 2
[m] → R+. The goal is to maximize∑n
i=1 wi(Si) where Si is the set of items allocated to agent i. Variants of the problem arise by considering
different classes of valuation functions wi and different models (adversarial/stochastic) for the arrival
ordering of the items. We remark that in this work we do not consider any game-theoretic aspects of this
problem.
The origin of this line of work can be traced back to a seminal paper of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani
[KVV90] on online bipartite matching. This can be viewed as a welfare maximization problem where
one side of the bipartite graph represents agents and the other side items; each agent i is interested in
the items N(i) joined to i by an edge, and he is completely satisfied by 1 item, meaning the valuation
function can be written as wi(S) = min{|S ∩ N(i)|, 1}. Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani gave an elegant
(1− 1/e)-competitive randomized algorithm, which improves a greedy 1/2-approximation and is optimal
in this setting.
Recent interest in online allocation problems arises from applications in online advertising, where the
items represent ad slots associated with search queries, and agents are advertisers interested in having their
ad displayed in connection with certain queries. A popular model in this context is the budget-additive
framework [GKP01, MSVV05, BJN07] where valuations have the form wi(S) = min{∑j∈S bij , Bi}. More
generally, combinatorial auctions [LLN06] form a setting where multiple items are sold to multiple agents
with valuation functions wi. Again, practical restrictions often require that the decision about each item
needs to be made immediately, rather than after seeing the entire pool of items. Hence the online model,
which we study in this paper.
The baseline algorithm in this setting is the greedy algorithm, due to Fisher, Nemhauser and Wolsey,
who initiated the study of problems involving maximization of submodular functions [NWF78, FNW78,
NW78]. The greedy algorithm simply allocates each incoming item to the agent who gains from it the
most and is 1/2-competitive whenever the valuation functions of the agents are monotone submodular
[FNW78, LLN06]. This is in fact the most general setting known where a constant-factor approximation
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can be achieved even for the offline welfare maximization problem (using value queries; more general
classes of valuations can be handled when more powerful queries are available [Fei06]). Thus the basic
question in most variants of this problem is whether the factor of 1/2 is optimal or can be improved. For
the offline welfare maximization problem with monotone submodular valuations, a (1−1/e)-approximation
has been found [Von08], and this is optimal [KLMM08].
At the other end of the spectrum is the above-mentioned bipartite matching problem, which can be
viewed as a welfare maximization problem with valuation functions of the form wi(S) = min{|S∩N(i)|, 1}
(a very special case of a submodular function). The (1−1/e)-competitive algorithm of [KVV90] is optimal
in the adversarial online setting; several improvements have been obtained in various stochastic settings
[GM08, FMMM09, BK10, MOS11, MOZ12]. Factor (1 − 1/e)-competitive algorithms have been also
found in two adversarial budget-additive settings, the small-bids case, wi(S) = min{∑j∈S bij , Bi} where
bij ≪ Bi [MSVV05], and the single-bids case, wi(S) = min{∑j∈S bij , Bi} where bij ∈ {0, bi} for some bi
independent of j [AGKM11]. A unifying generalization of these (1− 1/e)-competitive algorithms to the
budget-additive setting, wi(S) = min{∑j∈S bij , Bi}, has been conjectured but still remains open. Prior
to this work, it was conceivable that a (1−1/e)-competitive algorithm might exist for arbitrary monotone
submodular valuations, but the best known online algorithm gave only an o(1) improvement over 1/2
[DS06].
Our results. We prove that:
• In the online setting with submodular valuations, the factor of 1/2 cannot be improved unless
NP = RP (even by randomized algorithms against an oblivious adversary). Hence, the greedy
1/2-competitive algorithm is optimal up to lower-order terms. This holds in fact for the special case
of coverage valuations (see Section 2).
• In the online setting with budget-additive valuations, we prove that no (randomized) algorithm
is 0.612-competitive with respect to a natural LP, which has been used successfully in the special
case of small bids [BJN07]. Thus, a (1 − 1/e)-competitive algorithm would need to use a different
approach (see Section 3).
• In a stochastic setting with items arriving i.i.d. from an unknown distribution, the greedy algorithm
is (1−1/e)-competitive for valuations with the property of diminishing returns (a natural extension
of submodularity to multisets which we define in Section 4.1). This is optimal even for coverage
valuations and a known (uniform) distribution, unless NP = RP (see Section 4).
Our techniques. Our hardness result for online algorithms in the adversarial setting relies on a
combination of two sources of hardness: (1) the inapproximability of Max k-cover due to Feige [Fei98],
and (2) the lack of information arising from the unknown online ordering. A careful combination of
these two ingredients gives an optimal hardness result (1/2 + ǫ) for online algorithms under coverage
valuations. Our hardness result in the i.i.d. stochastic setting also relies on the hardness of Max k-cover.
A consequence of our use of the computational hardness of (offline) Max k-cover is that our results rely
on a complexity-theoretic assumption (NP = RP ), which is somewhat unusual in the context of online
algorithms.
Our negative result for budget-additive valuations is based on an integrality-gap example for the
natural LP and does not rely on any complexity-theoretic assumption. This result does not rule out,
e.g., a (1 − 1/e)-competitive algorithm for budget-additive valuations, but we consider it instructive,
considering recent efforts to develop online algorithms in the primal-dual framework. Our result points
to the fact that perhaps the natural LP is too weak for the general budget-additive setting, and stronger
LPs such as the Configuration LP should be considered (also, see a discussion in [CG08]).
Finally, our positive result for the greedy algorithm in the i.i.d. stochastic setting is an extension of
a similar analysis for budget-additive valuations [DJSW11]. Here, we want to point out the definition of
valuation functions satisfying the property of diminishing returns (Section 4.1). This is a generalization of
submodularity to functions on multisets. We remark that for set functions, the properties of diminishing
returns and submodularity coincide, but this is not the case for functions on multisets. We believe that
our generalization is a natural one, considering the original motivation for submodularity in the context
of combinatorial auctions, and we wish to highlight this definition for possible future work.
In the following, we state our results more formally and present the proofs.
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2 Online allocation with coverage valuations
Welfare maximization. In the welfare maximization problem (sometimes also referred to as the
“allocation problem” or “combinatorial auctions”), the goal is to allocate |M | = m items to n agents with
valuation functions wi : 2
M → R+ in a way that maximizes
∑n
i=1 wi(Si), where Si is the set of items
allocated to agent i (satisfying Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j).
Online welfare maximization. In the online version of the problem, items arrive one by one and
we have to allocate each item when it arrives, knowing only the agents’ valuations on the items that have
arrived so far. An algorithm is c-competitive if, for any ordering of the incoming items, it achieves at least
a c-fraction of the (offline) optimal welfare. A randomized algorithm is c-competitive against an oblivious
adversary if, for any ordering of the incoming items (fixed before running the algorithm), it achieves at
least a c-fraction of the optimal welfare in expectation.
Coverage valuations. A valuation function w : 2M → R+ is called a coverage valuation if there is a
set system {Aj : j ∈M} such that w(S) = |⋃j∈S Aj | for all S ⊆M .
Submodular valuations. A valuation function w : 2M → R+ is called submodular if w(S ∪ T ) +
w(S ∩ T ) ≤ w(S) + w(T ). It is called monotone if w(S) ≤ w(T ) whenever S ⊆ T .
Succinct representation and oracles. For complexity-theoretic considerations, it is important
how the valuation functions are presented on the input. In this paper, we assume that coverage valuations
are presented explicitly, by a succinct representation of size polynomial in |M |. Submodular valuations
are presented by means of a value oracle, which can answer queries in the form “What is the value of
wi(S)?”
Our main result for online welfare maximization is as follows.
Theorem 2.1. Unless NP = RP , there is no (1/2 + δ)-competitive polynomial-time algorithm (even
randomized, against an oblivious adversary) for the online welfare maximization problem with coverage
valuations and constant δ > 0.
Our main tool is Feige’s hardness reduction, which proves the optimality of (1− 1/e)-approximation
for Max k-cover [Fei98]. We also require some additional properties of this reduction, which have been
described in [FT04, FV10]. We summarize the properties that we need as follows:
Hardness of Max k-cover. For any fixed c0 > 0 and ǫ > 0, it is NP-hard to distinguish between
the following two cases for a given collection of sets S ⊂ 2U , partitioned into groups S1, . . . ,Sk:
1. YES case: There are k disjoint sets, 1 from each group Si, whose union is the universe U .
2. NO case: For any choice of ℓ ≤ c0k sets, their union covers at most a (1− (1− 1/k)ℓ + ǫ)-fraction
of the elements of U .
This holds even for set systems with the following properties:
• every set has the same (constant) size s; and
• each group contains the same (constant) number of sets n.
As we show in Section 2.1, this reduction also gives hard instances for welfare maximization with
coverage valuations, proving that any (offline) (1 − 1/e + δ)-approximation would imply P = NP . In
Section 2.2, we prove our result, Theorem 2.1.
Our approach. We produce instances of online welfare maximization by taking multiple copies of
a hard instance I for offline welfare maximization and repeating them with certain (random) agents
gradually dropping out of the system. We prove that an online algorithm faces two obstacles: it cannot
solve the offline instance I optimally (in fact it already loses a factor of 1 − 1/e there), and in addition
it does not know in advance which agents will drop out at what time. A careful analysis of these two
obstacles in combination gives the optimal hardness of (1/2 + δ)-approximation for online algorithms.
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2.1 Warm-up: hardness of offline welfare maximization
First, we show how Feige’s reduction implies the hardness (1−1/e+δ)-approximation for welfare maximiza-
tion with coverage valuations. This was previously proved by a more involved technique in [KLMM08].
The result of [KLMM08] has the additional property that it holds even when all agents have the same
coverage valuation; in our reduction the valuations are different.
Reduction. Consider a set system that forms a hard instance of Max k-cover as described above. We
produce an instance of welfare maximization with n agents and m = kn items (where n is the number
of sets in each group, and k is the number of groups). Each agent will have a valuation associated with
this set system. However, the way items are associated with sets will be different for each agent. Let the
kn items be described by pairs (j1, j2) ∈ [k]× [n], and let the sets in the set system be denoted by Aj1,j2
where (j1, j2) ∈ [k]× [n]. Then, the item (j1, j2) for agent i is associated with the set Aj1,j2+i (mod n). In
other words, the value of a set of items S for agent i is
wi(S) =
∣∣∣ ⋃
(j1,j2)∈S
Aj1,(j2+i mod n)
∣∣∣.
Now consider the two cases:
• YES case: There are k sets, one from each group, covering the universe. Denote these sets by Aj,π(j)
for some function π : [k]→ [n]. Then, there is an allocation where agent i receives the set of items
Si = {(j, π(j)− i mod n) : j ∈ [k]}. Note that these sets of items are disjoint, due to the cyclic shift
depending on i. Also, each agent is perfectly satisfied, since the union of the sets associated with
her items is
⋃
j∈[k]Aj,π(j) = U . Hence wi(Si) = |U | for all i.
• NO case: For each choice of ℓ ≤ c0k sets, they cover at most a (1 − (1− 1/k)ℓ + ǫ)-fraction of the
universe. (We choose c0 to be a large constant.) In other words, any agent who receives ℓ ≤ c0k
sets gets value at most wi(Si) ≤ (1− (1−1/k)ℓ+ ǫ)|U |. Here, it does not matter who receives which
items, as we have a bound depending solely on the number of items received. Since this bound is
a concave function, the best possible welfare is achieved when each agent receives exactly k items,
and this yields welfare (1− (1− 1/k)k + ǫ)|U | per agent. By choosing k arbitrarily large and ǫ > 0
arbitrarily small, we obtain welfare arbitrarily close to (1− 1/e)|U | per agent.
In the following, we will use this hard instance of welfare maximization with coverage valuation as a
black box.
2.2 Hardness of online welfare maximization
Here we prove Theorem 2.1. We produce a reduction from Max k-cover to online welfare maximization
as follows.
The hard online instances. Let I be an instance of welfare maximization with coverage valuations,
obtained from a hard instance of Max k-cover (as in Section 2.1), with n agents and m = kn items. For
a parameter t ≥ 1, we produce the following instance I(t) of online welfare maximization, with tn agents
and tm items, proceeding in t stages:
• In the first stage, we have t copies of each agent of the instance I, with exactly the same valuation
function. The valuation function for each agent is determined by the set system of I. The m items
of instance I arrive in an arbitrary order.
• After each stage, one copy of each agent is effectively “deactivated”, in the sense that all subsequent
items have zero value for her. The copy of each agent that disappears is chosen by an adversary.
• In stage t′ ∈ {1, . . . , t}, we have (t − t′ + 1)n “active agents” remaining, who are still interested in
the remaining items. In each stage, m items of the original instance arrive in an arbitrary order,
but now they are valuable only for the remaining active agents. For these agents, the items are
effectively copies of the items that arrived in previous stages, and they are represented by the same
sets.
These instances were inspired by the 1− 1/e lower bound for online matching [KVV90]. Essentially,
we take an instance of bipartite matching that is hard for online algorithms and expand each incoming
vertex into an entire instance of welfare maximization with coverage valuations, to impose the additional
difficulty of approximating an APX-hard problem at each stage.
We analyze this instance in a series of claims.
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Claim 2.2. The offline optimum in the YES case is tn|U |.
Proof. The offline optimum allocates all items in stage j to those agents who will be deactivated at the
end of this stage. Since these are n agents whose valuations of the items of this stage correspond exactly
to the instance I, in the YES case they can obtain optimal value n|U | (since every agent can cover the
universe U). Adding up over all stages, the total value collected by all agents is tn|U |.
Claim 2.3. Let the adversary choose a copy of each agent to be deactivated after each stage independently
and uniformly at random from the remaining active copies. Then the expected total number of items
allocated to the agents deactivated at the end of stage j is at most m ln t
t−j
.
Proof. Let Aj denote the agents deactivated right after stage j; Aj contains exactly 1 copy of each agent.
Consider i ≤ j and condition on the set of agents active in stage i. The choice of which agents will appear
in Aj will be made after stage j, independently of what the algorithm does in stage i. Since the choice
of Aj is uniform in each stage j, each of the t − i + 1 copies of a given agent active in stage i has the
same probability ( 1
t−i+1
) of appearing in Aj . The number of items allocated in each stage is m, hence
the expected number of items allocated to Aj in stage i is
m
t−i+1
. By linearity of expectation, the number
of items allocated to Aj between stages 1 and j is
j∑
i=1
m
t− i+ 1 ≤
∫ j
0
m
t− xdx = m ln
t
t− j .
Claim 2.4. For every ǫ′ > 0, there are ǫ, c0 > 0 and a constant lower bound on k (parameters of the
Max k-cover reduction) such that for every j ≤ (1 − ǫ′)t, the expected value collected in the NO case by
the agents deactivated at the end of stage j is at most (j/t + ǫ′)n|U |.
Proof. Denote again by Aj the agents deactivated at the end of stage j. By Claim 2.3, the expected
number of items allocated to Aj is at most m ln
t
t−j
. Let µ denote the expected number of items allocated
per agent in Aj : we get µ ≤ mn ln tt−j = k ln tt−j . Assuming that j ≤ (1 − ǫ′)t, we have µ ≤ k ln 1ǫ′ . Let
us set c0 = 1+ ln
1
ǫ′
, and let us denote by ν(ℓ) the largest value that an agent can possibly obtain from ℓ
items. By properties of the NO case, we know that for ℓ ≤ c0k, we have ν(ℓ) ≤ (1 − (1− 1/k)ℓ + ǫ)|U |.
For ǫ = 1
2
ǫ′ and k lower-bounded by some sufficiently large constant, we can replace this bound by
ν(ℓ) ≤ (1− e−ℓ/k + ǫ′)|U |.
A technical point here is that this bound holds only for ℓ ≤ c0k, while the actual number of allocated
items is random and could be much larger. However, we can deal with this issue as follows. Let us define
φ(x) = (1− e−x/k + ǫ′)|U |. The derivative of φ at µ is φ′(µ) = 1
k
e−µ/k|U |. Therefore, since the function
φ(x) is concave, we have φ(x) ≤ φ(µ) + φ′(µ)(x − µ), for ℓ ∈ [0, c0k]. Thus we obtain a (weaker) linear
bound:
ν(ℓ) ≤ φ(µ) + φ′(µ)(ℓ− µ) = (1− e−µ/k + ǫ′ + 1
k
e−µ/k(ℓ− µ))|U |.
Furthermore, we always have the trivial bound ν(ℓ) ≤ |U |, for any ℓ. This bound is anyway stronger than
the one above for ℓ ≥ c0k, because we have c0k ≥ µ+ k. Therefore, we obtain the following bound for all
ℓ ≥ 0:
ν(ℓ) ≤ min{|U |, (1− e−µ/k + ǫ′ + 1
k
e−µ/k(ℓ− µ))|U |},
and this (piecewise linear) bound is still concave. Since the expected number of items per player is
E[ℓ] = µ, the worst case is that each agent in Aj indeed receives µ items (deterministically), and her
value is ν(µ) ≤ (1 − e−µ/k + ǫ′)|U |. Using our bound µ ≤ k ln t
t−j
, we obtain that the expected value
collected per agent in Aj is at most (1− t−jt + ǫ′)|U | = ( jt + ǫ′)|U |.
Theorem 2.1. Let us assume now that there is a ( 1
2
+ δ)-competitive algorithm for online welfare maxi-
mization with coverage valuations. We set ǫ′ = δ/4 and the parameters c0, ǫ accordingly to this value of
ǫ′ (see Claim 2.4). Given an instance I of Max k-cover, we can also assume that k is sufficiently large
as required by Claim 2.4; otherwise all parameters of the Max k-cover instance are constant, and we
can solve it by exhaustive search. If k is sufficiently large, we run the presumed online algorithm on the
random instance I(t) that we constructed above.
In the NO case, denote by Vj the expected value collected by agents deactivated after stage j. By
Claim 2.4, we have Vj ≤ ( jt + ǫ′)n|U | for j ≤ (1− ǫ′)t. The value collected by the agents deactivated in
each of the last ǫ′t stages is Vj ≤ n|U |, because every agent can possibly get value at most |U |. Adding
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up the values of agents over all stages, we obtain that the online algorithm returns a solution of expected
value
t∑
j=1
Vj ≤
(1−ǫ′)t∑
j=1
(
j
t
+ ǫ′
)
n|U | + ǫ′tn|U | ≤ t
2
n|U |+ 2ǫ′tn|U | =
(
1
2
+ 2ǫ′
)
tn|U |.
In contrast, the offline optimum in the YES case is tn|U | (by Claim 2.2) and hence the ( 1
2
+δ)-competitive
algorithm must return expected value at least ( 1
2
+ δ)tn|U | = ( 1
2
+ 4ǫ′)tn|U |, a constant fraction better
than the NO case. Since the possible values returned by the algorithm are in the range [0, tn|U |], we can
distinguish the two cases with constant two-sided error.
In fact, we can make the error one-sided as follows. If some agent receives ℓ ≤ c0k items (c0 as in the
proof of Claim 2.4) whose value is more than (1− (1−1/k)ℓ+ ǫ)|U |, we answer YES, otherwise we answer
NO. Note that by the proof of Claim 2.4, in the YES case, we will answer YES with probability Ω(1),
because otherwise the solution is almost always bounded by the same analysis as in the NO case, and the
expected value of the solution would be less than ( 1
2
+4ǫ′)tn|U |, which cannot be the case. In the NO case,
we always answer NO, because there are no ℓ ≤ c0k items of value more than (1−(1−1/k)ℓ+ǫ)|U |. Thus we
can solve the Max k-cover decision problem with constant one-sided error, which implies NP = RP .
3 Online budget-additive allocation
In this section we prove that no online algorithm can obtain a better than 0.612 approximation with respect
to the standard LP in the budget-additive case. We now define the budgeted allocation problem[CG08].
Definition 3.1. Let Q be a set of m indivisible items and A a set of n agents, respectively, where agent
a is willing to pay bai for item i. Each agent a has a budget constraint Ba, and on receiving a set
S ⊆ Q of items pays min{Ba,∑i∈S bai}. An allocation Γ : A → 2Q is a partitioning of the items Q into
disjoint subsets Γ(1), . . . ,Γ(n). The maximum budgeted allocation problem, or simply MBA, is to find the
allocation which maximizes the total revenue, that is
∑
a∈Amin
{
Ba,
∑
i∈Γ(a) bai
}
.
Note that one can assume without loss of generality that bai ≤ Ba, ∀a ∈ A, i ∈ Q. Indeed, if bids are
larger than budget, decreasing them to the budget does not change the value of any allocation. We now
introduce the standard LP relaxation of the maximum budgeted allocation problem [CG08]:
max
∑
a∈A,i∈Q
baixai :
∀a ∈ A,
∑
i∈Q
baixai ≤ Ba;
∀i ∈ Q,
∑
a∈A
xai ≤ 1;
∀a ∈ A, i ∈ Q, xai ≥ 0.
(1)
It was shown in [CG08] that the integrality gap of LP (1) is exactly 3/4. We now show that no
online algorithm can obtain value better than a factor 0.612 of this LP. Thus, if a (1− 1/e)-competitive
algorithm exists, it has to use other techniques, perhaps a stronger LP relaxation.
Our basic building block will be an instance with agents A = {a1, a2} with budgets Ba1 = Ba2 = 3
and items I = {i1, i2, i3} such that baj ,ik = 2 for all j = 1, 2 and k = 1, 2, 3. Note that the value of the
standard LP on this instance is 6, while the maximum allocation is 5 since an agent that gets two items
can only pay 1 for the second item that is allocated to him.
We now use the small instance that we just described to construct an online instance similarly to
Section 2. Denote the set of agents in the system by A. We will have |A| = 2t and Ba = 3 for all a ∈ A.
Items will arrive in t stages. It will be convenient to use a partition A =
⋃t
s=1A
(s) of A into disjoint sets
of size 2. The agents will gradually drop out of the system, i.e., agents who drop out at time j will not
be interested in items that arrive after j. As before, for each j = 1, . . . , t we refer to the set of agents
that did not drop out before time j as active at time j, and refer to the other sets of agents as deactivated
at time j. Initially all sets A(s), s = 1, . . . , t are active. After each stage, A(s) for s uniformly random
among the remaining active sets is deactivated. We denote the set deactivated after stage j by Aj .
In each stage j = 1, . . . , t a set of items Ij arrives, where |Ij | = 3 and bai = 2 for all a ∈ A that are
active in stage j. Note that the value of the standard LP for our instance is 3t: for each j = 1, . . . , t
allocate 2/3 of each item in Ij to each agent in the set Aj .
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We now upper bound the value of any allocation that an online algorithm can obtain. Let
g(x) =


2x, if x ≤ 1
x+ 1 if 1 ≤ x ≤ 2
3 o.w.
(2)
We first prove:
Claim 3.2. Let a ∈ A denote an agent and let X denote the (random) number of items allocated to a.
Then the expected value obtained by a for these items is upper bounded by g(E[X]), where g(·) is given by
(2).
Proof. This follows from concavity of min
{
Ba,
∑
i∈Γ(a) bai
}
. Let x = E[X]. Then if x < 1, the maximum
is achieved if exactly one item is allocated to a with probability x, yielding value 2x. If 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, then
the maximum is achieved if 1 item is always allocated to a at the price of 2, and then a second item is
allocated with probability x at the price of 1, yielding value 2 + (x− 1) = x+ 1. Otherwise if x ≥ 2, the
payoff cannot be larger than the budget of a, i.e. 3.
We can now prove:
Theorem 3.3. No online (randomized) algorithm for the budgeted allocation problem can achieve (in
expectation) more than a 0.612-fraction of the optimal value of the linear program (1).
Proof. We first upper bound the expected number of items allocated to agents Aj (recall that Aj is the
set of agents deactivated after stage j). Let X1j , X
2
j denote the (random) number of items allocated to
the two agents in Aj . By the same argument as in the proof of Claim 2.3, which we do not repeat here,
we have that each agent that is active at time i = 1, . . . , j appears in Aj with probability
1
t−i+1
. Since
three items arrive in each stage, we have
E[X1j +X
2
j ] ≤
j∑
i=1
3
t− i+ 1 ≤ 3
∫ j
0
1
t− xdx = 3 ln
(
t
t− j
)
.
Now by Claim 3.2 together with convexity of the function g(·) we get that the value obtained by the
online algorithm is upper bounded by
t∑
j=1
[
g(E[X1j ]) + g(E[X
2
j ])
] ≤ t∑
j=1
2g
(
3
2
ln
(
t
t− j
))
≤ t
∫ 1
0
2g
(
3
2
ln
(
1
1− x
))
dx. (3)
We now split the interval [0, 1] as [0, 1] = [0, x1]∪[x1, x2]∪[x2, 1], where 32 ln
(
1
1−x1
)
= 1 and 3
2
ln
(
1
1−x2
)
=
2, i.e., x1 = 1− e−2/3 and x2 = 1− e4/3. We get by (2) that the RHS of (3) is equal to
t
∫ 1−e−2/3
0
3 ln
(
1
1− x
)
dx+ t
∫ 1−e−4/3
1−e−2/3
[
3
2
ln
(
1
1− x
)
+ 1
]
dx+ 3t · e−4/3 < 0.612 · 3t.
Recalling that the value of the standard LP on our instance is 3t completes the proof.
4 Stochastic allocation in the i.i.d. model
The i.i.d. stochastic model. Here we consider a model where items arrive from some (possibly
known or unknown) distribution D over a fixed collection of items M . In each step, an item is drawn
independently at random from D and we must allocate it irrevocably to an agent. The total number of
items can be either known or unknown.
In this model, we compare to the expected offline optimum, OPT = E[OPT (M)] where M is the
random multiset of items that appear on the input. We say that an algorithm is c-competitive if it
achieves at least c ·OPT in expectation over the random inputs (and possibly its own randomness).
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4.1 Diminishing returns on multisets
In this section, we would like to consider the class of submodular valuations and its extension to multisets.
Submodular valuations on {0, 1}m express the property of diminishing returns, and this has indeed been
the primary motivation for their modeling power as valuation functions. However, considering the stochas-
tic setting with i.i.d. samples, we should clarify how we deal with possible multiple copies of an item. In
other words, we need to consider valuation functions f : Zm+ → R. An extension of submodularity to the
Z
m
+ lattice that has been used in the literature is the following condition: f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) ≤ f(x)+f(y),
where ∨ and ∧ are the coordinate-wise max/min operations. Unfortunately, this condition does not quite
capture the property of diminishing returns as it does in the case of {0, 1}m: note that in particular it does
not impose any restrictions on f(x) if the domain is 1-dimensional, x ∈ Z+. Considering the property of
diminishing returns, we would like the condition to imply that f is concave in this 1-dimensional setting.
Therefore, we define the following property.
Definition 4.1. A function f : Zm+ → R has the property of diminishing returns, if for any x ≤ y
(coordinate-wise) and any unit basis vector ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), i ∈ [m],
f(x+ ei)− f(x) ≥ f(y + ei)− f(y).
Note that when restricted to {0, 1}m, this property is equivalent to submodularity. Also, note that a
simple way to extend a monotone submodular function f : {0, 1}m → R to f˜ : Zm+ → R, by declaring that
additional copies of any item bring zero marginal value (i.e. f˜(x) = f(x ∧ 1)), satisfies the property of
diminishing returns. In particular, coverage valuations on multisets interpreted in a natural way (multiple
copies of the same set do not cover any new elements), have the property of diminishing returns. In some
sense, we believe that this is the “right extension” of submodularity to multisets, at least for applications
related to combinatorial auctions and welfare maximization.
We also consider the following natural notion of monotonicity.
Definition 4.2. A function f : Zm+ → R is monotone, if f(x) ≤ f(y) whenever x ≤ y.
4.2 Our results
We prove that in the i.i.d. stochastic model with valuations satisfying the property of diminishing returns,
the best one can achieve is a (1−1/e)-competitive algorithm. In fact, the factor of 1−1/e is achieved by the
same greedy algorithm that gives a 1/2-approximation in the adversarial online model [FNW78, LLN06].
Greedy algorithm: Suppose the multisets assigned to the n agents before item j arrives are (T1, . . . , Tn).
Then assign item j to the agent who maximizes wi(Ti + j) −wi(Ti).
We remark that this algorithm obviously does not need to know the distribution or the number of
items in advance.
Theorem 4.3. The greedy algorithm is (1 − 1/e)-competitive for welfare maximization with valuations
satisfying the property of diminishing returns in the stochastic i.i.d. model.
Theorem 4.4. Unless NP = RP , there is no (1 − 1/e + δ)-competitive polynomial-time algorithm for
welfare maximization with coverage valuations in the i.i.d. stochastic model, for fixed δ > 0.
Since coverage valuations satisfy the property of diminishing returns, we conclude that 1− 1/e is the
optimal factor in the stochastic i.i.d. model for coverage valuations as well as any valuations satisfying
diminishing returns.
4.3 Analysis of the greedy algorithm for stochastic input
Here we prove Theorem 4.3. Our proof is a relatively straightforward extension of the analysis of [DJSW11]
in the budget-additive case. First, we need a bound on the expected optimum.
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Lemma 4.5. The expected optimum in the stochastic model where m items arrive independently, item j
with probability pj, is bounded by
LP = max
∑
i,S
xi,Swi(S) :
∀j;
∑
i,S
xi,Scj(S) ≤ pjm;
∀i;
∑
S
xi,S = 1;
∀i, S; xi,S ≥ 0
where wi is the valuation of agent i, S runs over all multisets of at most m items, and cj(S) ≥ 0 denotes
the number of copies of j contained in S.
Proof. Consider the optimal (offline) solution OPT (M) for each realization of the random multiset M
of arriving items. Let xi,S denote the probability that the multiset allocated to agent i in the optimal
solution is S. Then the expected value of the optimum is E[OPT (M)] =
∑
i,S xi,Swi(S). Also, each
multiset S contains cj(S) copies of item j, so the expected number of allocated copies of item j is∑
i,S xi,Scj(S). On the other hand, this cannot be more than the expected number of copies of j in M ,
which is E[cj(M)] = pjm. Therefore, xi,S is a feasible solution of value OPT = E[OPT (M)].
Lemma 4.6. Assume that wi are monotone valuations with the property of diminishing returns. Condi-
tion on the partial allocation at some point being (T1, . . . , Tn). Then the expected gain from allocating the
next random item is at least 1
m
(LP −∑i wi(Ti)).
Proof. Let xi,S be any feasible LP solution and let yij =
∑
S xi,Scj(S). Recall that cj(S) denotes the
number of copies of j contained in S. Note that by the LP constraints,
∑
i yij ≤ pjm. We use the notation
Ti + S to denote the union of multisets (adding up the multiplicities of each item). By the property of
diminishing returns, we have
wi(Ti + S)− wi(Ti) ≤
∑
j
cj(S)(wi(Ti + j)− wi(Ti)).
Adding up these inequalities multiplied by xi,S ≥ 0, we get∑
i,S
xi,S(wi(Ti + S)− wi(Ti)) ≤
∑
i,j,S
xi,Scj(S)(wi(Ti + j)− wi(Ti)) =
∑
i,j
yij(wi(Ti + j) −wi(Ti)).
Since
∑
S xi,S = 1 by the LP constraints, and wi(Ti + S) ≥ wi(S) by monotonicity, we obtain∑
i,S
xi,Swi(S)−
∑
i
wi(Ti) ≤
∑
i,j
yij(wi(Ti + j) − wi(Ti)). (4)
Now consider a hypothetical allocation rule (depending on the fractional solution): If the incoming item
is j, we allocate it to agent i with probability
yij
pjm
. (By the LP constraints, these probabilities for a fixed
j add up to at most 1.) Since item j appears with probability pj , overall we allocate item j to agent i
with probability
yij
m
. By (4), the expected gain of this randomized allocation rule is
E[random gain] =
∑
i,j
yij
m
(wi(Ti + j) − wi(Ti)) ≥ 1
m
(∑
i,S
xi,Swi(S)−
∑
i
wi(Ti)
)
.
However, the greedy allocation rule gives each item to the agent maximizing her gain. Therefore, the
greedy rule gains at least as much as the randomized allocation rule, for any feasible solution xi,S. This
implies
E[greedy gain] ≥ maxE[random gain] ≥ 1
m
(
LP −
∑
i
wi(Ti)
)
.
Now we can prove Theorem 4.3.
9
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Denote the allocation obtained after allocating t items (T
(t)
1 , . . . , T
(t)
n ). Lemma 4.6
states that conditioned on (T
(t)
1 , . . . , T
(t)
n ), the expected value after allocating 1 random item will be
E
[∑
i
wi(T
(t+1)
i ) | T (t)1 , . . . , T (t)n
]
≥
∑
i
wi(T
(t)
i ) +
1
m
(
LP −
∑
i
wi(T
(t)
i )
)
.
Taking an expectation over the partial allocation (T
(t)
1 , . . . , T
(t)
n ), we obtain
E
[∑
i
wi(T
(t+1)
i )
]
≥ E
[∑
i
wi(T
(t)
i )
]
+
1
m
E
[
LP −
∑
i
wi(T
(t)
i )
]
.
Let us denote W (t) = E[
∑
i wi(T
(t)
i )]. The last inequality states W (t+ 1) ≥ W (t) + 1m (LP −W (t)), or
equivalently LP −W (t+ 1) ≤ (1− 1
m
)(LP −W (t)). By induction, we obtain
LP −W (t) ≤
(
1− 1
m
)t
(LP −W (0)) ≤ e−t/mLP.
The expected value of the solution found by the greedy algorithm afterm items isW (m) = E[
∑
i wi(T
(m)
i )];
we conclude that W (m) ≥ (1− 1/e)LP ≥ (1− 1/e)OPT .
4.4 Optimality of 1− 1/e in the stochastic i.i.d. model
Here we prove Theorem 4.4. We prove essentially that the stochastic online problem cannot be easier
than the offline problem. However, the reduction is not quite black-box and we need some properties of
the hard coverage instances that we discussed in Section 2.
Proof. Recall the instance I of welfare maximization with coverage valuations (Section 2), for which it
is NP-hard to achieve approximation better than 1 − 1/e. We transform it into an instance I[t] in the
stochastic i.i.d. model as follows. We pick a parameter t = poly(m) and produce t identical copies of each
agent in I. If the number of items in I is m, we let tm i.i.d. items arrive from the uniform distribution
on the m items of I. By Chernoff bounds, with high probability the number of copies of each item on
the input will be t±O(√t logm) = t±O(√t log t).
Consider the YES case. The items of I can be allocated so that each of the n agents covers the
universe. Since we have at least t − O(√t log t) = (1 − o(1))t copies of each item with high probability,
they can be allocated to (1 − o(1))tn agents of the instance I[t] so that these agents get full value |U |.
Thus the expected offline optimum is at least (1− o(1))tn|U |.
On the other hand, in the NO case, any agent in I who gets ℓ ≤ c0m/n items has value at most
(1 − (1 − n/m)ℓ + ǫ)|U |. Since the total number of items on the input of I[t] is tm and the number of
agents is tn, an agent can only get m/n items on average. As the bound on the value as a function of the
number of items is concave (and we can deal with the fact that this bound works only up to ℓ ≤ c0m/n,
similarly to Section 2), the optimum value is achieved if each agent receives m/n items. Then the total
value collected is (1 − (1 − n/m)m/n + ǫ)tn|U |, which can be made arbitrarily close to (1 − 1/e)tn|U |.
Note that this holds with probability 1, irrespective of the randomness on the input.
If we had a (1 − 1/e + δ)-competitive algorithm in the stochastic i.i.d. model, we could distinguish
these two cases with constant one-sided error, which would imply NP = RP .
References
[AGKM11] G. Aggarwal, G. Goel, C. Karande, and A. Mehta. Online vertex-weighted bipartite matching
and single-bid budgeted allocations. Proc. of ACM-SIAM SODA, 2011.
[BK10] B. Bahmani and M. Kapralov. Improved bounds for online stochastic matching. Proc. of
ESA, 170-181, 2010.
[BJN07] N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, and S. Naor. Online primal-dual algorithms for maximizing ad-
auctions revenue. Proc. of ESA, 253–264, 2007.
[CG08] D. Chakrabarty and G. Goel. On the approximability of budgeted allocations and improved
lower bounds for submodular welfare maximization and GAP. Proc. of IEEE FOCS, 687–696,
2008.
10
[DJSW11] N. Devanur, K. Jain, B. Sivan, and C. A. Wilkens. Near optimal online algorithms and fast
approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems. Proc. of ACM EC, 2011.
[DS06] S. Dobzinski and M. Schapira. An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial
auctions with submodular bidders. Proc. of ACM-SIAM SODA, 1064–1073, 2006.
[Fei98] U. Feige. A threshold of lnn for approximating set cover. Journal of the ACM, 45(4):634–652,
1998.
[Fei06] U. Feige. On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive. Proc. of ACM STOC,
41–50, 2006.
[FT04] U. Feige and P. Tetali. Approximating min-sum set cover. Algorithmica 40:4, 219–234, 2004.
[FV10] U. Feige and J. Vondra´k. The submodular welfare problem with demand queries. Theory of
Computation 6, 247–290, 2010.
[FMMM09] J. Feldman, A. Mehta, V. Mirrokni and S. Muthukrishnan. Online stochastic matching:
Beating 1− 1/e. Proc. of IEEE FOCS, 117–126, 2009.
[FNW78] M. L. Fisher, G. L. Nemhauser, and L. A. Wolsey. An analysis of approximations for maxi-
mizing submodular set functions - II. Math. Prog. Study, 8:73–87, 1978.
[GKP01] R. Garg, V. Kumar, and V. Pandit. Approximation algorithms for budget-constrained auc-
tions. Proc. of APPROX, 102–113, 2001.
[GM08] G. Goel and A. Mehta. Online budgeted matching in random input models with applications
to adwords. Proc. of ACM-SIAM SODA, 982–991, 2008.
[KVV90] R. Karp, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani. An optimal algorithm for online bipartite matching.
Proc. of the 22nd ACM STOC, 1990.
[KLMM08] S. Khot, R. Lipton, E. Markakis, and A. Mehta. Inapproximability results for combinatorial
auctions with submodular utility functions. Algorithmica, 52(1):3–18, 2008.
[LLN06] B. Lehmann, D. J. Lehmann, and N. Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal
utilities. Games and Economic Behavior 55:270–296, 2006.
[MOS11] V. Manshadi, S. Oveis Gharan, and A. Saberi. Online stochastic matching: Online auctions
based on offline statistics. Proc. ACM-SIAM SODA, 1285–1294, 2011.
[MSVV05] A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani. Adwords and generalized online matching.
Proc. of the 46th IEEE FOCS, 2005.
[MOZ12] V. Mirrokni, S. Oveis Gharan and M. Zadimoghaddam. Simultaneous approximations for
adversarial and stochastic online budgeted allocation. Proc. of ACM-SIAM SODA, 1690–
1701, 2012.
[NW78] G. L. Nemhauser and L. A. Wolsey. Best algorithms for approximating the maximum of a
submodular set function. Math. Op. Res., 3:177–188, 1978.
[NWF78] G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, and M. L. Fisher. An analysis of approximations for maxi-
mizing submodular set functions - I. Math. Prog., 14:265–294, 1978.
[Von08] J. Vondra´k. Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle
model. Proc. of the 40th ACM STOC, 67–74, 2008.
11
